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I.  Introduction 
  Many of the crucial debates in development economics are encapsulated in the 
question of economic convergence.  Is there a tendency for the poorer countries to 
grow more rapidly than the richer countries, and thereby to converge in living 
standards?  Or instead, are there tendencies for the "rich to get richer, and the poor to 
get poorer," so that the gap between rich and poor nations tends to widen over time?   
  An enormous professional debate over this issue has been underway during the 
past decade, instigated by several theoretical and empirical insights.  Paul Romer 
(1986) provided a major spur to the debate by introducing a theoretical growth model 
with increasing-returns-to-scale production technology, which results in a strong 
tendency for rich countries to maintain or even increase their lead over poorer 
countries.  Romer stressed that the more standard technology assumptions of the 
Solow growth model lead to the presumption that the poorer countries would 
experience faster growth.  Romer noted that his theoretical model with increasing 
returns to scale seemed to be broadly consistent with the cross-country growth 
experience of the post-war era, in which there was no discernable trend for the poorer 
nations to converge with the richer nations1. 
  Romer's point about the absence of convergence is evident in Figure 1.  We 
graph on the x-axis the 1970 level of per capita income of several dozen developing 
countries, and on the y-axis the growth of per capita income between 1970-892.  If 
convergence predominated in the data, then we would find a negative relationship 
between initial income in 1970 and subsequent growth between 1970 and 1989.  No 
such tendency is found overall in the world economy during this time period.  Many 
poor countries, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, not only fail to grow faster 
than the rich countries; they in fact experience negative per capita growth, so that the 
gap between these countries and the rich countries widens significantly. 
  Romer's theoretical model and empirical insight set off a decade-long debate 
which still continues.  Many authors, such as Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), 
demonstrated that convergence seemed to hold among the richest countries alone, 
specifically those countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). Baumol and others suggested that there may be a 
"convergence club," meaning a subset of countries for which convergence applies, 
while countries outside of "club" would not necessarily experience convergence via-a-
vis those in the club: 
                                              
1 He was also careful, however, to point out the problem of interpreting such simple correlations: 
Cross-country comparisons of growth rates are complicated by the difficulty of controlling 
for political and social variables that appear to strongly influence the growth process. 
2 The exact definitions of the data and the selection of countries is described in the Appendix. J. Sachs & A. Warner 
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It also seems clear that convergence does not apply to the poorest of 
the world's economies, though the line separating those eligible for 
membership in the convergence club and those foreclosed from 
membership has not been determined definitively (Baumol, 1994, p. 82) 
  Baumol suggested that only countries with an adequate initial level of human 
capital endowments can take advantage of modern technology to enjoy the possibility 
of convergent growth.  Baumol (1994, p. 65) therefore speaks of the "advantages of 
moderate backwardness," arguing that while middle-income developing countries can 
take advantage of their lag in technology to borrow from abroad, the poorest countries 
are unable to bridge the gap in technology and knowledge. 
  Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) introduced a related 
notion of "conditional convergence," in which countries purportedly differ in their 
long-run per capita income levels, with each country tending to grow more rapidly the 
greater is the gap between its initial per capita income level and its own long-run per 
capita income level.  Formally, country i is assumed to have the long-run per capita 
income level yi*, and initial per capita income level yi.  The rate of growth,   y ×
i ,  is 
assumed to be an increasing function of the gap between  yi*  and  yi :   
(1)     y ×
i  =  b (yi* - yi)  
A positive value of b is said to signify conditional convergence.  In turn, yi*  is 
proxied by certain "structural" variables, such as the initial level of human capital, 
according to an equation  yi*  = Sgji Z ji.  Barro and co-authors then estimate a 
regression equation of the form: 
(2)     y ×
i  =  b (Sgji Zji - yi) 
They tend to find a positive and significant coefficient for b and significant 
coefficients on several structural variables Z.  Like Baumol, Barro 1991, p. 409) 
concludes that: 
A poor country tends to grow faster than a rich country, but only for a 
given quantity of human capital; that is, only if the poor country's human 
capital exceeds the amount that typically accompanies the low level of 
per capita income.  
 In  summary,  there  have been three dominant explanations offered in the 
literature for the absence of convergence in Figure 1.  The first holds that productive 
technology is intrinsically kind to the technological leader: the rich tend to grow richer Economic Convergence and Economic Policies 
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as a result of increasing returns to scale in one form or another3. The second holds that 
convergence is a fact of life, but only among countries with a sound human capital 
base for using modern technology.  The third holds that currently poor countries 
simply have low long-term potential (yi*), though countries do tend to grow faster the 
greater the gap between their current income and their own long-run potential.  Any of 
these explanations, if correct, would lead to profoundly pessimistic conclusions for the 
poorest countries.  Each concept suggests that the poorest countries will be unable to 
achieve rapid growth needed to close the gap with the richer countries.   
  We believe that all of these explanations of Figure 1 are too pessimistic 
regarding the potential for growth and convergence of the poorest countries.   
Economic growth, and therefore economic convergence, requires reasonably efficient 
economic institutions.  Poorly managed economies -- such as those with the absence of 
secure property rights, autarkic trade policies, inconvertible currencies, and so forth -- 
are unlikely to experience convergence no matter what the underlying production 
technology or initial level of human capital.  Since many, if not all, of the non-
convergent countries failed to maintain adequate economic institutions during the 
post-war era, it is possible that it is reversible policy failures, rather than technology or 
human capital that explains their failure to grow.  Put another way, the "convergence 
club" is better defined according to policy choices rather than initial levels of human 
capital.  We would also suggest that poor policy choices are reversible, not irrevocably 
linked to low levels of income.   
  Such an interpretation is more in line with the cross-country evidence than 
interpretations suggesting an intrinsic failure of convergence.  When we examine poor 
countries that have followed standard market-based economic policies, including 
respect for private property rights and open international trade, we note an 
overwhelming tendency towards convergence, even among countries that start with 
extremely low levels of human capital endowments and extremely low levels of initial 
per capita income.  In fact, it is hard to find a single case in which a poor country 
actually protected private property rights and maintained economic openness, and yet 
failed to achieved economic growth.  In essence, we subscribe to a much earlier, and 
widely cited judgment of Adam Smith4: 
Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degress of opulence 
from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and tolerable 
administration of justice. 
                                              
3 Increasing returns to scale is shorthand for a wide variety of technological possibilities, such as learning 
by doing, spillovers in knowledge accumulation, agglomeration economies among suppliers of 
specialized inputs to production, etc. 
4 This aphorism is quoted by A. Leddin and B. Walsh, in The Macroeconomy of Ireland, Gill & 
McMillan, 1995.  These authors in turn refer to the citation in Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great 
Powers. J. Sachs & A. Warner 
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  In our view, as in the view of Adam Smith, burdensome taxes on foreign trade 
(and related trade distortions such as import and export quotas) are of particular harm, 
since these not only distort economic incentives (e.g. pushing countries towards 
inefficient import-substituting industries), but they also cut countries off from 
international flows of knowledge. 
  In the next section of the paper, we demonstrate that good behavior in 
economic policy has been its own reward: all developing countries that have satisfied 
certain unexceptionable conditions on economic policy have experienced positive 
economic growth during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, and in almost all cases 
these countries have shown a tendency to grow more rapidly than the developed 
economies, and thereby to converge.  After demonstrating this point, we then 
undertake a cross-country regression analysis based on equation (2), to try to 
determine some of the specific ways that poor economic policies have affected the 
growth dynamics of developing countries. 
II.  Economic Policies and Economic Convergence 
  In this section we define a subset of countries that have sustained "appropriate" 
market-based economic policies during the period of observation, 1970-89.  We then 
examine whether there is a tendency towards economic convergence among this 
subset of qualifying countries during this subperiod.  In essence, we examine whether 
there is a convergence club for all countries that have sustained adequate basic 
economic policies.   
  Our selection criteria are as follows.  We start with the universe of all 135 
countries in the Heston-Summers data series, and then eliminate 18 countries 
(combined population of 8.4 million) that lack some or all of the necessary underlying 
data5.  We then establish two basic subsets of "appropriate" policies: one set related to 
property rights and one set related to integration of the economy in international trade.  
All countries that pass both sets of criteria are considered to be countries that have 
pursued appropriate policies during the observation period.  We call these the 
"qualifying" countries.  Countries that fail at least one test are "non-qualifying."  We 
then examine the growth dynamics of the qualifying and non-qualifying economies.   
  With regard to the property rights test, a country is non-qualifying (i.e. judged 
to have inappropriate policies) if it is characterized by at least one of the following 
three conditions:   
  (1)   a socialist economic structure, according to the list of countries in  
  Kornai  (1993). 
                                              
5 Countries dropped from the sample because of a lack of data are: Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Comorros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Iceland, Kuwait, Oman, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Seychelles, Solomon 
Islands, Surinam, United Arab Emirates. Economic Convergence and Economic Policies 
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  (2)   civil war or major external war during the period 1970-89; 
  (3)   extreme deprivation of civil or political rights, according to the  
    Freedom House index, reported in McMillan, et. al. (1994); 
  These criteria are selected because failure on any of them would  tend to 
undermine efficient long-term private capital accumulation (including human capital 
accumulation), which is a fundamental feature of economic growth.  (Details on the 
variables and data sources are described in the Appendix).  
  The second test is economic openness.  One of the basic tenets of classical and 
neoclassical economics dating back to Adam Smith is the economic benefits of 
openness, including: increased specialization, efficient resource allocation according 
to comparative advantage, diffusion of international knowledge through trade, and 
heightened domestic competition as a result of international competition.   
  To test for openness, we include three kinds of measures.  First, the country 
must not impose excessive quotas on imports.  Second, the country must not impose 
excessive quotas, or state monopolies, on exports.  Third, the country must maintain a 
reasonably convertible currency.  We judge convertibility according to the gap 
between the black market and official exchange rate.  A large black market premium 
signals inconvertibility of the national currency, and thereby effective closure from 
world markets6.  In addition, we exclude South Africa and the two countries located 
within South Africa (Lesotho and Swaziland) on the grounds of the international 
boycott of the South African economy during much of the period of observation.   
  Specifically, a country fails the openness test as a result of any of the following 
criteria (with details in the Appendix): 
  (1)   a very high proportion of imports covered by quota restrictions,  
    according to the index prepared by Lee (1993); 
  (2)   for Sub-Saharan Africa, a high proportion of exports covered by state 
    export monopolies and state-set prices, according to an index in the  
  World  Bank  (1993)7; 
                                              
6 As is well known, rationing of foreign exchange to importers at the official exchange rate is 
economically similarly, if not identical, to a quota on imports. 
7 The World Bank index of monopolization of exports was constructed only for 29 Sub-Saharan African 
countries in the World Bank (1993) study on African structural adjustment.  We are confident that none 
of the countries outside of Sub-Saharan Africa that we characterize as "qualifying" vis-a-vis openness 
should be disqualified on the basis of monopolization of exports.  More generally, outside of Sub-
Saharan Africa, trade quotas are overwhelmingly on the import side rather than the export side. J. Sachs & A. Warner 
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  (3)   a black-market premium over the official exchange rate of 20 percent 
    or more, on average, either for the decade of the 1970s or the decade 
    of the 1980s (or both).    
  Failure on any of these criteria indicates that the economy is operating in 
substantial isolation from the world economy.   
  The list of non-qualifying countries according to any of the political or 
openness criteria is shown in Table 1, and the list of qualifying countries is shown in 
Table 2.  A statistical summary of the growth performance of the qualifying and non-
qualifying countries is shown in Table 3.  We see that most countries are excluded on 
the openness criteria and these have below average growth rates.  We expect, 
therefore, that the qualifying developing countries are more likely to exhibit economic 
convergence once the non-qualifiers are dropped from the sample.  It is notable that 23 
of 29 countries with 1970 income levels above $4,000 passed both the political and 
openness tests (income is measured in U.S. dollars, in constant 1985 prices and 
adjusting for purchasing power), in contrast with just 13 out of 88 countries with 
initial income levels of less than $4,000.  Therefore, the finding that there is 
convergence of the richer countries is consistent with the view that convergence is due 
to appropriate economic policies, rather than to high initial income per se.   
  The role of policy choices in convergence is dramatically evident in Figures 
2(a) and 2(b), where we divide the sample in Figure 1 into groups of qualifying and 
non-qualifying countries.  We see in Figure 2(a) that the qualifying countries display 
a strong tendency towards economic convergence, with the countries with the 
initially low per capita income levels growing more rapidly than the richer countries.  
The non-qualifiers in Figure 2(b) do not display any tendency towards convergence.  
The non-qualifying countries in Figure 2(b) are clearly the source of the failure of 
convergence that we noted in Figure 1.  
  Even more strikingly, there is not a single country in our sample (which covers 
120 countries and approximately 90 percent of the world's population as of 1985) 
which pursued appropriate policies during 1970-89 and yet which had per capita 
growth of less than 2 percent per year!  There are, on the other hand, 13 developing 
countries (< $4,000 initial income) that pursued appropriate policies according to our 
criteria, and all of these countries grew at more than 2 percent per year.  We therefore 
find no cases to support the frequent worry that a country might "do the right things" 
in terms of overall policy, and yet fail to grow.  Of course, economic reforms take time 
to work, so that some countries that have recently adopted outward-oriented market 
reforms (in the late 1980s or early 1990s) might not yet enjoy high growth rates as a 
result of those reforms8.   
                                              
8 On the other hand, there are many recent reformers that are already experiencing rapid economic 
growth, such as Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru in Latin America, and Poland, Estonia, Slovenia in post-
  Economic Convergence and Economic Policies 
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  So far we have argued the case of sufficiency: a set of good policies is 
sufficient to produce a good economic outcome (i.e. convergent growth).  What of 
necessity?  Are there many countries that "broke the rules" and yet achieved high 
economic growth?  There are six countries that failed to qualify on one or more of the 
criteria and yet that had per capita growth of more than 3 percent per year during 
1970-89: Botswana, Cape Verde, China, Hungary, Lesotho, and Tunisia.  (Remember 
that of the 75 developing non-qualifying countries, only 6, or 8 percent, achieved 
growth of three percent or more, while of the qualifying countries, 11, or 85 percent, 
achieved growth of three percent or more). 
  It is relatively straightforward to account for five of these six "exceptions."  
Botswana failed to qualify on the black-market premium for the 1970s, but did qualify 
for the 1980s.  It passed all other criteria.  Overall, therefore, the policies have been 
relatively well balanced, especially in the 1980s.  Moreover, since around 80 percent 
of Botswana's exports are diamonds, and a remarkably small proportion (less than 5 
percent) of the labor force is in agriculture, Botswana avoided the anti-agricultural 
biases of most of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
  As for Cape Verde, Hungary, and Tunisia, the "successful" growth during 
1970-89 is more apparent than real.  All three countries pursued statist development 
strategies that produced growth in the 1970s and financial crises in the 1980s and early 
1990s.  In all three cases, there was a serious downturn in growth at the end of the 
1980s, as financial crises hit the government.  Taken over a slightly longer time 
period, therefore, these cases would not look like successes and would not be 
anamalous.   
  Lesotho was excluded on the general grounds that it was expected to suffer 
from the worldwide boycott against South Africa.  Otherwise it passed the remaining 
criteria.  It appears that its small size (population 1.8 million) allowed Lesotho to make 
effective use of the South African market (both for goods and for migrant labor) even 
as South Africa itself was subjected to international sanctions. 
  In our view, there is only one deep puzzle to these exceptions, the case of 
China.  It is indeed true that China has violated most of the rules: obscure property 
rights, political repression, high black market premia on the yuan, extensive reliance 
on trade quotas.  Nonetheless, China has experienced a boom.  We believe that China's 
success is strongly related to its particular economic structure at the onset of its market 
reforms at the end of the 1970s.     
  In particular, China was a very poor economy in 1978, with three-fourths of the 
labor force in peasant farming.  The essence of Deng Xiaping's reforms at the end of 
the 1970s was to free the peasant economy from state controls, even while maintaing 
  
communist Central and Eastern Europe.  We lack systematic data, however, to bring the record up to the 
mid-1990s. J. Sachs & A. Warner 
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the state's grip on the non-peasant state-owned sector (which covered just 18 percent 
of the labor force).  This "two-track approach" (de-control of the peasant sector, with 
continued control of the state sector) was sufficient to unleash China's growth and 
labor-intensive export boom, even though it did not solve many problems of poor 
performance in the state-owned sector.  See Sachs and Woo (1993) for further details 
of the two-track approach in China.    
III.  Regression Analysis 
  We now turn to a regression analysis, to confirm and deepen  these basic 
findings.  Various regression estimates are reported in Table 4, showing the simple 
bivariate relationship between initial income in 1970 and subsequent growth between 
1970 and 1989.  We see in regression (1) the absence of convergence for the entire 
sample of countries (the coefficient on initial income is positive rather than negative, 
and is statistically insignificant).  In regression (2) we see the strong evidence of 
convergence within the set of qualifying countries.  The coefficient on initial income 
suggests that each percentage point rise in per capita income in 1970 reduces 
subsequent annual growth by .013 percentage points.  Each doubling of 1970 income 
reduces annual growth by .92 percentage points (=ln(2)*1.292).  In regression (3), we 
confirm the absence of convergence among the non-qualifying countries. 
  The regressions in Table 5 confirm the growth effects of the political and 
openness variables in the overall sample.  In regression (4), we regress annual 
economic growth on the logarithm of initial income and five dummy variables, for the 
three political and two openness criteria.  For each of the variables, a value of 1 
signifies "non-qualifying" and a value of 0 signifies "qualifying."  Therefore, we 
should expect negative coefficients on each of these variables in the growth 
regression.  This is indeed what we find.  In each case, the coefficient signifies the 
effect on annual growth, in percentage point terms, of the failure to conform to the 
particular standard of policy.  For example, an excessive black-market premium is 
estimated to be associated with 1.933 percentage points of reduced annual growth (t-
statistic equal to 5.3).  In regression (5), we compress the criteria into two variables, a 
single political variable (PNQ) and an openness variable (ONQ).  Again, a value of 1 
on either variable signifies "non-qualifying" on the criterion.  Both the political and 
openness criteria are highly negative and statistically significant.  An F-test comparing 
regressions (4) and (5) fails to reject the restriction that the five dummy variables may 
be reduced to two composite dummy variables.    
 In  Table 6, regression (6), we replicate the basic Barro (1991) regression on 
cross-country growth for our sample and time period.  We see that the basic Barro 
equation performs as expected over our sample and time period, with conditional 
convergence (a negative, significant coefficient on initial income), positive effects of 
educational attainment (though not significant), positive effects of the investment-
GDP ratio, and negative effects of measures of political instability. 
  Regression (7) estimates the same equation but includes the two dummy 
variables for political and openness qualifications (1 for non-qualifiers, 0 for Economic Convergence and Economic Policies 
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qualifiers).  When we add PNQ and ONQ, we find that the political non-qualifiers 
grow, on average, by  1.75   percentage points less per year than the political 
qualifiers, while the openness non-qualifiers grow by 1.86 percentage points less than 
the openness qualifiers.   The rest of the structural variables remain roughly the same 
as in regression (6), though the initial education levels are even less significant.  This 
is consistent with our view that the growth rate over this period was determined less 
by initial human capital levels than by policy choices. 
  We attempted various experiments to interact the PNQ and ONQ dummy 
variables with the right-hand-side variables in the Barro equation, to see for example 
whether the effects of education, initial income, investment, and the like were different 
for the qualifiers and non-qualifiers.  To our surprise, the interaction terms generally 
proved to be small and statistically insignificant.  The effect of policy failure was 
therefore measured to result in a downward step in growth, without clearly affecting 
the conditional impacts of the other right-hand-side variables. 
  In equation (7), we add two variables to the basic growth equation that we have 
explored in earlier work.  The first variable, PXI, is a measure of the raw-material 
intensity of the economy, based on the share of raw-materials exports in total exports 
in 1970.  The second variable, DTT, is a measure of the change in the terms of trade of 
the country during 1970-89.  As we argued in Sachs and Warner (1994), there are 
reasons to believe that resource-rich countries will experience lower growth than 
resource poor countries, all other things equal, because the natural resource base will 
push resources into the non-tradeables sector at the expense of the manufacturing 
tradeables sector.  If, as is sometimes argued, the manufacturing sector is the site of 
technological spillovers and learning by doing, then the shift of resources to non-
tradeables could slow aggregate growth in the medium and long term.   
  As in our earlier paper, we find in regression (7) that the natural resource proxy 
variable does indeed help to account for cross-country growth, and this is true even 
controlling for PNQ and ONQ.   Specifically, countries that specialized in natural 
resource exports at the start of the period tended to grow more slowly than 
manufacturing exporters.  There is also some evidence, though not statistically 
significant, that a rising terms-of-trade over the period raised average growth over the 
period.  While the inclusion of the PXI variable seems to be justified even after 
controlling for ONQ and PNQ (which remain highly significant in the regression), the 
presence of PXI tends to eliminate the statistical significance of the investment-to-
GDP ratio.  Raw-materials exporters systematically had lower rates of physical 
investment relative to GDP.  When the equation must choose between PXI and 
investment-to-GDP as an explanation of growth, the PXI variable dominates. 
  In other regressions, not reported in the table, we instrument the PXI variable in 
order to eliminate the possibility that high-resource intensity of exports is a result of 
poor growth performance rather than a cause.  As in Sachs and Warner (1994) we use 
an instrument suggested originally by Adrian Wood: the ratio of aggregate years of 
schooling in the country divided by total land area of the country.  Countries with high 
schooling-to-land ratios should be expected, on Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade J. Sachs & A. Warner 
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theoretic grounds, to be manufacturing exporters, while countries with low ratios 
should be raw-materials exporters.  The use of this instrument does not change our 
finding with regard to the negative effect of PXI on subsequent growth.       
  In regressions (9) and (10) we run the Barro equation, augmented by PXI and 
DTT, separately for the two subsets of countries, the qualifiers and the non-qualifiers.  
For the qualifying countries, in regression (9), the basic equation remains satisfactory, 
with evidence of conditional convergence (a negative, statistically significant effect of 
initial income on subsequent growth), and with the continuing importance of the PXI 
variable.  For the non-qualifiers, in regression (10), there is also (surprising-though not 
quite significant) evidence of conditional convergence, with the initially poorer 
countries tending to grow faster after controlling for the other right-hand-side 
variables.  Of course, the constant term in (10) is lower than in (9), reflecting the 
overall drag on growth of inappropriate policies.   
  In regression (8), we had found that PNQ and ONQ reduced overall growth 
when controlling for the other variables.  Since poor policies might also affect the rates 
of investment relative to GDP and the rates of human capital accumulation, we would 
expect indirect adverse growth effects of poor policies as a result of slower capital 
accumulation (both physical and human).  In regressions (11) - (13), we therefore 
check whether the qualifying and non-qualifying countries differed systematically in 
the rates of capital accumulation, once we control for initial income and resource-
intensity of initial production (as proxied by PXI).  In regression (11) we find that the 
openness non-qualifiers (ONQ = 1) had significantly lower investment-to-GDP ratios, 
with ONQ reducing the investment ratio by an average of 5.8 percentage points.   
Interestingly, there is also some evidence that richer countries have higher investment 
rates than poorer countries.  
  In regressions (12) and (13), we ask whether the increase in educational 
attainment between 1970 and 1985 was different for the two subsets of countries, 
again controlling for initial income levels and PXI.  We find no evidence that the non-
qualifiers had a lower improvement in the coverage of primary and secondary 
education than did the qualifiers.  It is clear, though, that the more developed 
economies had less improvement in educational coverage than did the poorer countries 
(as evidenced by the significant, negative sign on initial income in both regressions).   
  
  Based on the regression analysis, we may make five conclusions: 
(1) there is strong evidence of unconditional convergence for qualifying countries, and 
no evidence of unconditional convergence for non-qualifying countries;  
(2) non-qualifying countries grew systematically more slowly than did the qualifying 
countries, so that "good" policies mattered;  
(3) each of the policy criteria played a role in determining average growth rates;  Economic Convergence and Economic Policies 
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(4) the role of the policy criteria remains in place after controlling for other growth 
factors, as in a standard Barro cross-country growth equation;  
(5) poor policies seem to affect growth directly, controlling for other factors, while 
poor trade policies also seemed to affect the rate of accumulation of physical capital.  
IV.  Discussion and Conclusions 
  The absence of strong evidence across countries of unconditional economic 
convergence has led to a number of disparate views in the economics profession in 
recent years.  Some have argued that non-convergence is a technological fact of life.  
Others have suggested that laggard countries require special remedial policies to 
provoke high-speed growth, lest they get trapped in a low-growth economy.  Industrial 
policies a la East Asia have sometimes been posited as a model for such lagging 
countries.  The evidence in this paper strongly calls into question these views. 
  A more parsimonious interpretation of the evidence is that convergent growth 
can be achieved by all or virtually all countries that follow a reasonable set of political 
and economic policies, including civil peace, basic adherence to political and civil 
rights, and an open economy, through the absence of trade quotas, export monopolies, 
or inconvertible currencies.  All countries that followed such a pattern achieved per 
capita growth between 1970 and 1989 of two percent per year or greater.   
  We note that many authors have introduced political and openness data into 
cross-country growth equations, and indeed we use many of the criteria suggested by 
others9.  Our contribution is not to show that trade "matters" for growth, since this has 
already been done.  Our contribution, we believe, is to show the strength of 
convergence among all well-behaving countries.  We believe that this simple and 
important fact has been obscured among growth theorists.   
  Another way to summarize the message for the poorer countries is to consider 
the following matrix.  In this matrix, the group of countries with real GDP in 1970 of 
less than $4,000 are sorted in two dimensions: those that do or do not satisfy the 
criteria; and those that have grown quickly (G7089>3.0), moderately (3.0 > G7089 > 
2.0), and slowly (G7089<2.0).   
                                              
9 A partial list of these studies includes Barro (1991), DeLong and Summers (1991), Levine and Renelt 
(1992), King and Levine (1993), Svensson (1994), Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel (1992). J. Sachs & A. Warner 









 11   6 
Moderate Growth 
(3>G7089>2) 
 2    18 
Slow Growth 
(G7089<2.0) 
 0    51 
  Most of the countries of course lie either in the upper left or lower right cells, 
reiterating the finding that growth is strongly associated with whether a country 
satisfies the criteria.  What is surprising is that so few of the countries lie in the lower 
left or upper right cells.  In particular, there is not a single country that falls in the 
bottom left cell, of good policies and slow growth.  This fact lends support to the view 
that the criteria we consider are sufficient for growth.  On the other hand, the fact that 
there are 6 countries in the upper right cell shows that these criteria are not necessary 
for growth: some countries have indeed grown rapidly without satisfying our criteria.  
We have argued, however, that in fact 5 of these 6 countries really conform with the 
general pattern, when difficulties with timing and specific patterns of policy are taking 
into account.  Only China is really heterodox by our standards, and even there we have 
reasons to suspect that China's particular growth pattern could not easily be emulated 
by other countries.  
  The findings above may also be expressed in terms of conditional probabilities.  
Suppose a representative poor country back in 1970 found itself behind a Rawlsian 
"veil of ignorance".  The policymakers could know the numbers in the matrix, but not 
the specifics of the country, in choosing which path to follow.  Would such a country 
gamble that it would come out like China based on the numbers above?  Conditional 
on closed policies, the probability of growing at 3 percent or more would be only 0.08 
(6 divided by the 76 disqualified countries with low income).  On the other hand, the 
gamble based on good policies would yield vastly better odds. 
  It is natural to ask whether our results are a case of reverse causation, in which 
slow economic growth led to bad policies -- for example, if stagnant economies tried 
to experiment with trade barriers in order to speed economic growth.  We think this is 
highly unlikely.  In most cases, the "bad" policies were selected early in the post-war 
era, long before a track record on growth had occurred.  These countries stuck with the 
policy choices until quite recently, certainly into the 1970s and 1980s, the interval of 
observation.  Moreover, the few cases of developing countries that pursued outward 
oriented policies did so in part because of their particularly close security relations 
with the United States or with European nations.  For these reasons, we believe that it 
is appropriate to take the policy regime "as given," for purposes of studying the effects 
of policy choices on growth.  In a follow up study, we propose to examine the sources Economic Convergence and Economic Policies 
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of basic development strategies of these nations, according to geography, colonial 
history (if any), date of independence and therefore experience of government, and 
economic structure.     
  In conclusion, we believe that are findings are significant. Dozens of countries 
in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union have recently 
undertaken market-reform policies that will shift them from the non-qualifying to the 
qualifying category of nations.  Our results suggest that most or all of these reforming 
nations have a good chance to benefit from these reforms with higher economic 
growth.  Indeed, we can already see the fruits of reform in several economies in Latin 
America (e.g. Argentina, Peru, Bolivia), in Asia (e.g. the Philippines), and in Africa 
(e.g. Mauritius, Botswana).   J. Sachs & A. Warner 
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Tables & Figures 
  Table 1. List of Non-qualifying Countries 
  (value of 1 means disqualification) 
 
                  Reason for disqualification: 
 
                  SOC        WAR        RIGHT       BMP     TRADE       ONQ            PNQ    G7089       GDP70 
 
Algeria              0  0     1     1     0     1     1      2.216     1833 
Angola               1     1  1     1     0     1     1     -2.715     1110 
Argentina           0     0    0     1     0     1     0     -0.758     4169 
Bangladesh         0     0     0     1     1     1     0      1.640      922 
Benin               1     0     1     0     1     1     1     -0.935     1138 
Bolivia             0     0    0     1     0     1     0     -0.046     1612 
Botswana           0    0     0     1    na     1     0      7.118      867 
Brazil                0     0     0     1     0     1     0      2.931     2390 
Burkina Faso     0     0     0     0     1     1     0      1.615      399 
Burundi            0     0     1     1     1     1     1      2.500      324 
Cameroon         0     0     1     0     1     1     1      2.145      866 
Cape verde         0     0     1    na    na     1     1      3.267      689 
C. African Rep.  0     0     1     0     1     1     1     -1.140      695 
Chad                0     0     1     0     1     1     1     -1.848      543 
Chile                0     0     0     1     0     1     0      0.443     3695 
China               1     0     1    na    0     1     1      5.518      825 
Colombia          0     0     0     0     1     1     0      2.159     2100 
Congo               1     0     1     0     1     1     1      1.791     1581 
Costa Rica         0     0     0     1     1     1     0      1.302     2793 
Cote d'Ivoire      0     0    na     0     1     1    na     -0.162     1322 
El Salvador        0     0     0     1     0     1     0     -0.009     1740 
Ethiopia            1     1     1     1     0     1     1     -0.094      287 
Gabon               0    0     1     0     1     1     1     -0.094     3679 
Gambia             0     0     0     0     1     1     0      0.347      603 
Ghana               0     0     0     1     1     1     0     -1.159     1017 
Guatemala         0      0  0  0         1     1  0  .244  2004  
Guinea              0     0     1    na     1     1     1      0.103      353 
Guinea-Bissau    0     0     1    na     1     1     1     -0.016      661 
Guyana             0     0    0     1     0     1     0     -1.932     1711 
Haiti                 0     0     1     0     0     0     1      0.040      787 
Honduras          0     0     0     0     1     1     0      0.599     1206 
Hungary           1     0    na    na    na     1     1      3.466     3373 
India                0     0     0     1     1     1     0      2.093      703 
Iran, I.R. of       0     1     0     1     1     1     1     -1.696     4214 
Iraq                  0     1     1     1     0     1     1     -0.525     4270 
Israel                0     0     0     1    na     1     0      2.074     5705 
Jamaica             0     0     0     1     0     1     0     -0.571     2688 
Kenya               0     0     0     1     0     1     0      2.236      582 
Lesotho             0     0     0     0     1     1     0      4.875      387 
Liberia               0     1     0     0    na     na    1     -1.090      949 
Madagascar        0     0     0     1     1     1     0   `  -2.668     1125 
Malawi             0     0     1     1     1     1     1      0.816      431 
Mali                  0     0     1     0     1     1     1      1.781      389 
Mauritania         0     0     1     1     1     1     1     -0.697      881 
Mexico             0     0     0     1     0     1     0      1.418     3951 
Mozambique      1     0     1     1     1     1     1     -3.408     1461 
Myanmar (Burma) 0     0     1     1    na     1     1      2.037      392 
Nepal               0     0     0     1     0     1     0      2.026      644 
Nicaragua          1     1     0     1     1     1     1     -2.008     2184 
Niger               0     0     1     0     1     1     1     -2.456      749 
Nigeria             0     0     0     1     1     1     0     -0.202      770 
Pakistan           0     0     0     1     0     1     0      1.572      997 Economic Convergence and Economic Policies 
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Panama            0     1     0     0    na     na    1      0.303     2501 
Papua N Guinea  0     0    na     1     0     1     na    -0.981     1744 
Paraguay            0     0     0     1     0     1     0      2.368     1434 
Peru                  0     0     0     1     0     1     0     -1.014     2642 
Philippines        0     0     0     0     1     1     0      1.227     1369 
Poland              1     0     0    na    na     1     1      2.286     2981 
Rwanda             0     0     1     1     1     1     1      0.287      625 
Senegal             0     0     0     0     1     1     0     -0.120     1107 
Sierra Leone       0     0     0     1     1     1     0     -0.750     1050 
Somalia            1     1     1     1     0     1     1      0.148      842 
South africa        0     0     0     0     1     1     0      0.254     3160 
Sri Lanka           0     1     0     1     0     1     1      2.825     1307 
Swaziland          0     0     0     0     1     1     0     -0.476     2390 
Syria                 0     0     1     1     1     1     1      2.763     2205 
Tanzania            0     0     1     1     1     1     1      0.318      431 
Togo                0     0     1     0     1     1     1      0.059      620 
Trin & Tobago   0     0     0     1     0     1     0      1.159     6715 
Tunisia             0     0     0     0     1     1     0      3.601     1400 
Turkey              0     0     0     0     1     1     0      2.321     2180 
Uganda              0     0     0     1     1     1     0      0.879      763 
Uruguay            0     0     0     1     0     1     0      0.572     3876 
Venezuela          0     0     0     1     0     1     0     -1.508     7607 
Yugoslavia        1     0    na    na    na     1     1      2.854     3338 
Zaire                 0     1     1     1     0     1     1     -2.429      643 
Zambia             0     0     0     1     1     1     0     -2.173     1096 
Zimbabwe         1     0     0     1     1     1     1      0.987     1072 
 
Average                                                      0.708 
 
 
Notes: SOC is a dummy variable that equals 1 for Socialist countries (following the classification of Kornai 
(1992), table 1.1).  WAR is a dummy for countries with a major war or civil unrest on their territory during the 
period 1970-1989. RIGHT is a dummy for countries that have a high score (6 or 7) on Freedom House's index 
of denial of political or civil rights.  BMP is a dummy for countries that had an average black market premium 
higher than 20 percent for either the decade of the 1970's or the 1980's.  TRADE is a constructed dummy 
variable that equals 1 for countries with a high degree of trade protection, based on data on import quotas in 
Lee (1993) or the World Bank (1994).  ONQ is a dummy for countries that get disqualified on either BMP or 
TRADE, and PNQ is a dummy for countries that get disqualified on either SOC, WAR, or RIGHTS. G7089 is 
annual growth in real GDP per capita between 1970 and 1989, using version 5.5 of the Summers-Heston data.  
GDP70 is real GDP per capita in 1970 (units are 1985 international dollars).   
 J. Sachs & A. Warner 
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  Table 2. List of Qualifying Countries  
 
                                G7089      GDP70 
 
    Australia                 1.636       10947 
    Austria                   2.620        7569 
    Barbados                  2.574        4768 
    Belgium                   2.324        8459 
    Canada                    2.956       10169 
    Cyprus                    3.907        3777 
    Denmark                   1.787         9698 
    Finland                   2.946        8272 
    France                    1.860        9625 
    Germany, West            1.987        9586 
    Greece                    2.379         4236 
    Hong Kong                 6.229         4453 
    Indonesia                 5.098          699 
    Ireland                   2.894         4883 
    Italy                     2.542         7675 
    Japan                     3.349         7509 
    Jordan                    2.580         1409 
    Korea                     7.120         1680 
    Luxembourg                2.516        10024 
    Malaysia                  4.010        2116 
    Malta                     5.409        2383 
    Mauritius                 4.465        2338 
    Morocco                   2.393        1303 
    Netherlands               1.571        9241 
    New Zealand               1.233        9352 
    Norway                    3.142        8144 
    Portugal                  3.374        3341 
    Singapore                 6.388        3156 
    Spain                     2.313        6025 
    Sweden                    1.628       10688 
    Switzerland               1.237       13299 
    Taiwan                    6.742        2376 
    Thailand                  4.072        1512 
    United Kingdom           2.811        7703 
    United States             1.954       12706 
    Yemen, N.Arab             5.451         588 
 
    Average                   3.264 
 
 
Note: All of these countries had 0's for the dummy variables reported in table 1. Economic Convergence and Economic Policies 
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  Table 3. Summary of Growth Performance 
 
     Number  of    Mean 
     Countries    of  G7089 
All Countries         117      1.495 
High Income 
Countries (GDP70>4000) 
  Qualifying          23      2.456 
  Non-Qualifying because of: 
    Politics alone       0          na 
    Openness alone       4      0.242 
    Both          2     -1.110 
Low Income  
Countries (GDP70<4000) 
  Qualifying       13      4.693 
  Non-Qualifying because of: 
    Politics alone       1       0.040 
    Openness alone     38       1.058 
    Both       32      0.635 








  Table 4. Simple Convergence Regressions 
 
    Dependent  Variable:  G7089 
 
    All   All  Qualifying  All  Excluded 
      Countries Countries Countries 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
Constant   -1.239   14.191   2.116 
(t-ratio)    (-0.797)   (6.856)   (1.032) 
 
LGDP70   0.362   -1.292   -0.196 
(t-ratio)    (1.774)   (-5.305)   (-0.690) 
 
R  Bar  2    0.018   0.437   -0.007 
Mean  of  G7089   1.495   3.264   0.708 
Sigma    2.171   1.214   1.951 
Sample  Size   117   36   81 
 
 
Notes: G7089 is annual growth in real GDP per capita between 1970 and 1989, using version 5.5 of the 
Summers-Heston data.  LGDP70 is the log of real GDP per capita in 1970 (in this case GDP70 is measured in 
thousands of 1985 international dollars).   J. Sachs & A. Warner 
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  Table 5.  Growth Effects of the Political and Openness Measures 
 
    Dependent  Variable:  G7089 
  
    (4)   (5) 
 
 
Constant       8.832        8.282 
(t-ratio)               (4.932)       (4.408) 
 
SOC           -0.490            (-0.693) 
 
WAR           -1.116            (-1.530) 
 
RIGHT         -1.254            (-2.680) 
 
PNQ                    -0.891           (-2.091) 
 
BMP           -1.933            (-5.305) 
 
TRADE         -2.014            (-4.989) 
 
ONQ                     -2.776                (-5.973) 
 
LGDP70        -0.705       -0.604 
                (-3.307)       (-2.744) 
 
R  bar  2    0.438   0.306 
Mean  dv.   1.430   1.565 
Standard  Error   1.629   1.828 
Sample  Size   102   113 
 
Significance levels for F tests: 
 
H0: b(SOC)=b(WAR)=b(RIGHT) 0.714 
 
H0: b(BMP)=b(TRADE)    0.878 
 
H0: b(PNQ)=b(ONQ)     0.008 
 
 
Notes: SOC is a dummy variable that equals 1 for Socialist countries (following the classification of Kornai 
(1992), table 1.1).  WAR is a dummy for countries with a major war or civil unrest on their territory during the 
period 1970-1989. RIGHT is a dummy for countries that have a high score (6 or 7) on Freedom House's index 
of denial of political or civil rights.  BMP is a dummy for countries that had an average black market premium 
higher than 20 percent for either the decade of the 1970's or the 1980's.  TRADE is a constructed dummy 
variable that equals 1 for countries with a high degree of trade protection, based on data on import quotas in 
Lee (1993) or the World Bank (1994).  ONQ is a dummy for countries that get disqualified on either BMP or 
TRADE, and PNQ is a dummy for countries that get disqualified on either SOC, WAR, or RIGHTS. See the 
notes to table 4 for descriptions of G7089 and LGDP70 and the data appendix for further details.   Economic Convergence and Economic Policies 
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  Table 6. Growth Regressions based on Barro (1991)  
 
    Dependent Variable: G7089 
    (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Constant     7.036    12.425   18.037   30.190   9.051 
               (2.470)   (2.566)   (6.079)   (7.160)   (2.116) 
 
ONQ                  -1.920    -1.411 
                     (-4.284)  (-2.985) 
 
PNQ                  -1.437    -1.446 
                     (-3.108)  (-3.095) 
 
LGDP70      -1.013    -1.343    -1.874    -2.923    -0.917 
              (-2.588)  (-3.108) (-5.081) (-6.173) (-1.653) 
 
SEC70        3.732    1.194     3.044     1.744     4.344 
               (1.729)   (0.642)   (1.571)   (0.921)   (1.196) 
 
PRI70        0.324    -0.155    1.052    -1.415    0.534 
               (0.302)   (-0.167)  (0.961)   (-0.961)  (0.351) 
 
GVXDXE      -5.818    -7.269    -8.872    1.064    -5.881 
              (-1.574)  (-2.284)  (-2.779)  (0.169)   (-1.561) 
 
REVCOUP     -0.358    -0.064    -0.095    -3.328    -0.100 
              (-0.405)  (-0.086   (-0.127)  (-1.889)  (-0.106) 
 
ASSASSP     -1.931   -1.984    -2.367    -2.148    -2.245 
              (-1.211)  (-1.484)  (-1.673)  (-0.214)  (-1.363) 
 
PPI70DEV    -0.993    -0.749    -0.951    0.712    -0.964 
              (-2.240)  (-1.954)  (-2.530)  (0.424)   (-2.177) 
 
INV7089     11.954   8.538     5.170    -0.082    4.113 
              (3.314)   (2.658)   (1.599)   (-0.025)  (0.849) 
 
PXI71                         -2.344    -3.024    -2.572 
                              (-3.430)  (-5.164)  (-2.238) 
 
DTT7189                       0.854    -0.640    0.182 
                              (1.573)   (-0.772)  (0.252) 
 
R  bar  2    0.364 0.555 0.615 0.811 0.227 
Mean  dv.  1.587 1.638 1.635 3.226 0.638 
s.e.    1.644 1.374 1.305 0.742 1.464 
N   81 79 73 28 46 
 
Notes: SEC70 is the secondary school enrollment rate. PRI70 is the primary school enrollment rate. GVXDXE 
is the ratio of real government 'consumption' spending net of spending on the military and education to real 
GDP.  REVCOUP is the number of revolutions and coups per year, averaged over the period 1970-1985. 
ASSASSP is the average number of assassinations per million population, 1970-1985.  PPI70DEV measures 
the relative price of investment goods: the deviation of the log of the price level of investment (PPP I / Xrate 
relative to the U.S.) from the cross country sample mean in 1970.  INV7089 is the ratio of real gross domestic 
investment (public plus private) to real GDP, averaged over the period 1970-1989.  PXI71 is the ratio of 
exports of primary products to total exports in 1971.  DTT7189 is the change in the log of the external terms of 
trade between 1971 and 1989. J. Sachs & A. Warner 
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  Table 7. The Effects on Human and Physical Capital Accumulation 
 
   Dependent  Variables: 
 
    INV7089   DSYR     DPYR 
 
   (11)   (12)   (13) 
 
 
Constant    -0.143   0.124   0.162 
   (-1.810)   (2.748)   (4.311) 
 
ONQ   -0.040   0.002   0.003 
   (-2.312)   (0.196)   (0.341) 
 
PNQ   0.029   0.015   0.000 
   (1.856)   (1.617)   (0.034) 
 
LGDP70  0.049   -0.010   -0.018 
   (5.700)   (-1.982)   (-4.186) 
 
PXI71   -0.041   -0.006   -0.007 
   (-0.878)   (-0.402)   (0.588) 
 
R  bar  2   0.555   0.104   0.254 
Mean  d.v.  0.187   0.048   0.024 
s.e.   0.059   0.032   0.027 
N   106   89   84 
 
Notes: INV7089 is the ratio of public and private investment spending to GDP, averaged over the period 1970-
1989.  DSYR is average accumulation of secondary schooling over the period 1970-1985. Specifically, DSYR 
= [log(SYR85) - log(SYR70)]/15, where SYRxx is person-years of secondary schooling divided by the total 
population over age 15.  DPYR is accumulation of primary schooling, similarly calculated.     
 Economic Convergence and Economic Policies 
  - 27 -  CASE Foundation 
Data  Appendix 
  The data set in this paper begins with the sample of 135 countries included in the Summers 
and Heston data set.  For most of these countries, the growth variable (G7089) was calculated directly 
from the Summers and Heston data.  For seven countries, Comoros, Ethiopia, Liberia, Tanzania, 
Nicaragua, Iraq, and Nepal, growth was calculated using 1985 data rather than 1989 data.  In all cases 
growth is annual growth in per-capita real GDP, and is expressed in a common set of prices (1985 
international prices, in the Summers and Heston terminology). 
  13 countries remained that did not have adequate growth data, either because it was not 
available at all, or because it was not available for a sufficiently long time span.  These countries were 
Afganistan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Dominica, Grenada, Kuwait, Oman, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Solomon 
Islands, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and United Arab Emirates.  So, in summary, there were 122 countries 
with adequate growth data. 
  Of these 122 countries, 28 had missing data on at least one of our criteria.  Of these 28, 15 
would have been disqualified anyway, based on criteria for which data was available, so there was no 
need to obtain the missing data.  Of the remaining 14 that would not have been disqualified on other 
grounds, we made some effort to obtain the missing data.  These cases are discussed briefly in the next 
paragraph. 
  Australia, Luxembourg, Malta, and New Zealand were only missing data on trade orientation.  
Our judgement was that these countries should be classified as "open", bearing in mind that we only 
wish to exclude the extreme cases of non-integration with the world economy.  Lesotho and Swaziland 
were also missing data on trade orientation.  We decided that these two economies were so closely 
integrated with the South African economy that they should be considered "closed" because of the 
internationally-imposed isolation of South Africa during most of the 1970-1989 period.  Hong Kong 
was missing data on the variable to capture respect for property rights and basic civil rights.  Hong 
Kong passed because it has operated under the British legal framework. After these assessments, there 
remained five small countries for which we had insufficient data to make an informed assessment: 
Comoros, Iceland, Fiji, Seychelles, and Suriname.  Adding these 5 countries to the 13 excluded for 
lack of growth data, in total 18 countries were excluded from the sample for lack of data, leaving us 
with a sample of 117 countries to be divided into the qualifying and non-qualifying groups.   
  The list of these 117 countries are in table 1 (non-qualifying) and table 2 (qualifying), along 
with the data for each country on G7089 and GDP70.  Tables 1 and 2 also contain the values for the 
dummy variables we constructed for this paper, and these new variables are described partly in the 
text, but also in the notes to table 1.  Descriptions for the other variables used in this paper, along with 
sources, are given below.          
GDP70    Real GDP per capita from Summers and Heston version 5.5 in 1970 (1985  
  International  Prices). 
GDP89   Same variable for 1989. 
G7089    Real per capita growth rate of GDP, per annum: G7089 = [LN(GDP89) -  
  LN(GDP70)]/19.     
SEC70    Secondary school enrollment rate. Source: Barro and Lee, 1994. 
PRI70    Primary school enrollment rate. Source: Barro and Lee, 1994. 
GVXDXE  Ratio of real government 'consumption' spending net of spending on the military  
  and education to real GDP.  Source: Barro and Lee, 1994, who in turn used  
    Summers and Heston v. 5.5. J. Sachs & A. Warner 
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REVCOUP  Number of revolutions and coups per year, averaged over the period 1970-1985.   
    Source Barro and Lee, 1994. 
ASSASSP  Number of assassinations per million population per year, 1970-1985.  Source:  
    Barro and Lee, 1994. 
PPI70DEV  The deviation of the log of the price level of investment (PPP I / Xrate relative to 
    the U.S.) from the cross country sample mean in 1970.  Source: Authors  
    calculation based on the PISH5 price data in Barro and Lee, 1994. 
INV7089  Ratio of real gross domestic investment (public plus private) to real GDP,  
    averaged over the period 1970-1989.  Source: Barro and Lee, 1994, who in turn  
    used Summers and Heston v. 5.5. 
PXI71    Primary export intensity in 1971.  Ratio of exports of SITC (revision 1)  
    categories 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 68 to total exports in 1971, with both the numerator  
    and denominator expressed in nominal dollars.  These SITC categories include:  
    food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, inedible crude materials, oils and  
    fats, mineral fuels and lubricants and related materials, and non-ferrous metals.  
    Source: World Bank, World Tables, 1993, for all countries except Taiwan,  
    Singapore and South Africa.  Data for Taiwan was obtained from the Taiwan  
  Statistical  Data  Book, 1992. Data for South Africa was obtained from Bulletin of 
  Statistics, The Republic of South Africa, Pretoria, Dec. 1972 and June 1992,  
    (exports of raw diamonds and gold were included).  Data for Singapore was  
    estimated as 0.01 based on GDP and labor force data indicating that Singapore  
    produces no mining, no primary energy and only a very small amount of  
    agriculture, forestry and fishing products.  The data for Bangladesh is for 1972  
    rather than 1971.  The data for Cameroon was set to 1.0 -- it exceeded 1.0 using  
  the  published  data. 
DTT7189  Change in the log of the external terms of trade between 1971 and 1989.   
    DTT7189 = LN(TT89) - LN(TT71), where TT is the ratio of a U.S. dollar export 
    price index (1987=100) to an import price index in similar units.  Source: World  
  Bank, World Tables, 1993, and National statistical sources for Taiwan and South  
 Africa. 
 Economic Convergence and Economic Policies 
  - 29 -  CASE Foundation 
References 
  Adjustment in Africa, World Bank, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994. 
  Alesina, A S. Ozler, N. Roubini, and P. Swagel, Political Instability and Economic Growth, 
NBER Working Paper No. 4173, 1992 
  Barro, R. and X. Sala-i-Martin, "Convergence Across States and Regions," Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity, 1991:1 
  Barro, R., "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 106, 1991, 407-444. 
  Barro, R. and X. Sala-i-Martin, "Convergence," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100, No. 
2, 1992 
  Barro, R. and X. Sala-i-Martin, "Regional Growth and Migration: A Japan-United States 
Comparison," Journal of Japanese and International Economics, 6, 1992, pp. 312-346 
  Barro, R. and Jong-Wha Lee, "International Comparisons of Educational Attainment," Journal 
of Monetary Economics 32, 1993, 363-394. 
  Baumol, William J., Richard R. Nelson, Edward N. Wolff (eds.), Convergence of 
Productivity, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
  Ben-David, Dan.  "Equalizing exchange: trade liberalization and income convergence."   
Quarterly Journal of Economics August 1993, v108, n3, p653(27). 
  Dollar, David, "Outward Oriented Economies Really do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from 
95 LDCs, 1976-1985," Economic Development and Cultural Change 40, 1992, 523-544. 
  Dowrick, Steve, and Duc-Tho Nguyen, "OECD Comparative Economic Growth 1950-1985: 
Catch-up and Convergence," American Economic Review, 79, pp. 1010-30 
  King, Robert and Ross Levine, "Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 108, 1993, 717-738. 
  Kormendi, Roger and Philip Mequire, "Macroeconomic Determinents of Growth," Journal of 
Monetary Economics 16, 1985, 141-163. 
  Kornai, Janos, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1992. 
  Lee, Jong-Wha, "International Trade, Distortions, and Long-Run Economic Growth," IMF 
Staff Papers, vol. 40, No. 2, June 1993, 229-328. 
  Levine, Ross and David Renelt, "A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth 
Regressions," American Economics Review  82, 1992, 942-963. 
  Lucas, Robert, "On the Mechanics of Economic Development," Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 22, 1988, 3-42. 
  Mankiw, Gregory, David Romer, and David Weil, "A Contribution to the Empirics of 
Economic Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 1992, 407-437. 
  McMillan, John C., Gordon C. Rausser, and Stanley R. Johnson, "Economic Growth, Political 
and Civil Liberties," Occasional Paper No. 53, International Center for Economic Growth, San 
Francisco: ICS Press, 1994. 
  Romer, Paul M., "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth," Journal of Political Economy, 
1986, vol. 94, no. 5, pp. 1002-1037. 
  Romer, Paul M., "Endogenous Technological Change," Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 
vol. 98, no. 5, pt. 2, pp. S71-S102. 
  Svensson, Jakob, Investment, Property Rights, and Political Instability: Theory and Evidence., 
Seminar Paper 575, Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm. July 1994. 
  Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resources and Economic Growth., 
Unpublished Paper, Harvard University, August 1994. J. Sachs & A. Warner 







Table of Contents 
 
I.  Introduction..................................................................................................................3 
II.  Economic Policies and Economic Convergence........................................................6 
III.  Regression Analysis..................................................................................................10 
IV.  Discussion and Conclusions .....................................................................................13 
Tables & Figures...................................................................................................16 
Data  Appendix .....................................................................................................27 
References.............................................................................................................29 
Table of Contents..................................................................................................30 
 